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SECURE STATISTICAL DATABASES WITH RANDOM SAMPLE Q U E R I E S ^ 




A new inference control, called Random Sample Queries, is proposed Eor 
safeguarding confidential data in on-line statistical databases. The Random 
Sample Queries control deals directly with the basic principle of compromise 
by making it impossible for a questioner to precisely control the lormation 
of query sets. Queries for frequencies and averages are computed using random 
samples drawn from the query sets. The sampling strategy permits the release 
of accurate and timely statistics and can be implemented at very low cost. 
Analysis shows the relative error in the statistics decreases as the query set 
size Increases; in contrast, the effort required to compromise increases with 
the query set size due to larger absolute errors. Experiments performed on a 
simulated database support the analysis. 
(1) Work reported herein was supported in part by NSF Grant MCS77-0&835. 
(2) Author's present address: Computer Science Dept., Purdue University, 
W . Lafayette, IN 47907. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Protecting confidential personal records in on-line, centralized databases 
from unauthorized disclosure or modification is a problem of wide Interest. 
These systems may include access controls to protect records from unauthorized 
query or update; authentification schemes to certify the identities of users 
at terminals; information flow controls to restrict data to their allowed 
security levels; and encryption schemes to protect data while in transit through 
an insecure channel or while stored in an insecure medium 
None of these controls deals successfully with the Inference problem --
the deduction of confidential data by correlating the declassii .ed statistical 
summaries and prior information. For example, comparing the mean salary of 
two groups differing only by a single record may reveal the salary of the indi-
vidual whose record is in one group but not the other. The objective of inference 
controls is to make the cost of obtaininp information in this way unacceptably 
high. 
Census bureaus have dealt successfully with this problem for years. They 
reirnve from the database information that easily identifies an individual --
e.g., social security numbers and exact geographical locations; they release 
statistics drawn from only a small sample of the entire population [CAMP77, 
HANS71]. Unfortunately, these techniques do not work well in small or medium 
data management systems where records are added, deleted, or updated frequently. 
Modern relational database systems have powerful query languages which make it 
easy to request statistics about arbitrary subgroups of individuals. It has 
remained an open question whether inference can be controlled in such systems. 
Most of the research in this area has studied efficient attacks rather 
than effective safeguards. With few exceptions, proposed inference controls 
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are either easy to circumvent or impractical to implement. (See DENN78a, DENN781, 
DENN79d, and SCHL79C) Despite its negative tone, this research is valuable 
because the nature of the threat must be understood before effective counter-
measures can be built. 
The common feature of all attacks is that the user can control which set 
of records is queried. This paper investigates a new class of queries, called 
Random Sample Queries (RSQs), that deny the intruder precise control over the 
queried records. RSQs introduce enough uncertainity that users cannot isolate 
a confidential record but can get accurate statistics for groups of records. 
We briefly review our model of statistical databases and methods of 
compromise in Sections 2 and 3 , and then introduce Random Sample Queries in 
Section 4. Section 5 discusses- a possible implementation. Section 6 analyzes 
the errors in the statistics and compares them with the errors observed in 
experiments wi.th a simulated database. Section 7 studies the ability of 
RSQs to withstand attack. 
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2. STATISTICAL DATABASE MODEL 
A statistical database contains N confidential records. Each record 
contains several fields and each field contains a data value for some 
attribute (or category). An example of an attribute is SEX, whose two possible 
values are MALE and FEMALE. 
Statistics are obtained through queries of the database. A query is given 
in terms of a characteristic formula C , which is any logical formula over the 
values using the operators and (•)» 2 1 ("O •
 n o t
 ( ). The set of records 
whose values match C is called the query set X
c
 of C. The simplest forms of 







I is the size of X
c
, and 
SUM(C, j) = 2 * . • » where v is the value of field j in record i. 
iex„
1 J J 
U 
Note that SUM queries apply only to numeric data (e.g., SALARY). The responses 
from COUNT and SUN queries are used to calculate relative frequencies and means 
FBEQ(C) = COUNT(C) / N = n„ / N 
C
 (1) 
.AVG(C, j) = SUM(C, j) / COUNT(C). 
More general forms can be defined; for example, the SUM query could be modi-
fled to add up terms like (VJJ) i thereby providing the raw statistics for the 
k ^ moment. We will use q(C) to denote any of these kinds of queries. 
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3. A REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON METHODS OF COMPROMISE 
Compromise (or disclosure) occurs when a questioner deduces, from the 
responses of one or more queries, confidential information of which he was 
previously unaware [DALE77]. Researchers have studied methods of controlling 
compromise, but have found that each succumbs to simple attack or is impractical 
to use. 
Most of the attacks are based on isolating a single data element at the 
intersection of several query sets; the confidential value is obtained by 
solving a system of equations employing the responses of these queries. The 
defenses against these attacks are of four kinds: 
controls on the sizes of query sets 
controls on the overlaps of query sets 
distorting the data or the query responses 
sampling from the database 
These controls will be reviewed briefly in the next sections. 
3.1 Controls on the Sizes of Query Sets 
The minimum query size control aims to defend against attacks employing 
very large or very small query sets -- e.g., with a formula C that identifies 
a single record [CHIN77, HOFF70]. Let k denote a parameter giving the lower 
bound on allowable query set size. A query q(C) is not answered unless 
k <
 n
Q < N - k . Unfortunately, this control is often easily subverted 
(even for k near N/2) by a simple snooping tool called the "tracker" [DENN71b, 
DENN79c, SCHL75, SCHL79&, SCHW77b]. A tracker is a set of auxiliary characteris-
tics which are added to the original characteristics in the formation of a 
query. The auxiliary characteristics pad the query set of the original charac-
teristics to form answerable queries; the questioner subtracts out the effect 
of the auxiliary characteristics to determine the answer to the query for the 
original characteristics. Trackers are generally easy to find and apply. One 
of the most powerful is the general tracker: a formula T such that 2k < n 
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< N - 2k [DENN79b, SCHW77b], Given an unanswerable query q(C) and a tracker T , 
only a few queries are required to compuLe the answer to q(C) from answerable 
queries which pad C with T . For example, when n^ < k , frequencies and 
averages can be computed from: 
FREQ(C) = FRFXJ(C + T ) + FREQ(C + T) - 1 
(2) 
AVC(C , j) = [AVG(C + T , j)•FREQ(C + T) + AVC(C + T , j)•FREQ(C + T) 
AVG( T , j)'FREQ(T) - AVG( T , j)'FREQ(T)]/ FREQ(C) 
Similar equations are used when n
c
 > N - k (see DENN79b). 
3.2 Controls on the Overlap of Query Sets 
The minimum overlap control inhibits the responses from queries that have 
more than a predetermined number of records in common with each prior query 
[DOBK79], No efficient implementation of this control is known: before 
responding, the query program could have to compare the current query group 
against every previous one. This control may also be subverted by queries that 
overlap by small amounts (e.g., by solving a system of equations) [DAVI76, 
DOBK79, KAM77, RFIS78, SCHL75, SCHW77a, SCHW79]. 
An effective method of preventing a clever intruder from Isolating a 
record by overlapping queries is partitioning the database £YU78j. Records 
are stored in groups, each containing at least some predetermined number of 
records. Queries may apply to any set of groups, but never to subsets of records 
within any group. It is therefore impossible to isolate a record. A variant, 
is called microaftgregation: individuals are grouped to create many synthetic 
"average individuals"; statistics are computed for these synthetic individuals 
rather than the real ones [FE1G70]. Partitioning has two severe practical 
limitations in dynamic databases. First, the free flow of useful statistical 
information can be severeLy inhibited by excessively large groups or by ill-
considered groupings. Second, forming and reforming groups as records are 
Inserted* updated, and deleted from the database can lead to costly bookkeeping. 
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3.3 Distorting the Data or the Query Responses 
The minimum query size control and minimum overlap control give exact 
answers w h e
n
 they respond. Rounding aims to prevent inference by perturbing 
the responses. Under direct rounding, the answer to a query is rounded up or 
down by some small amount before it is released [HANS71, FFLL74, NARG72, KEED73]. 
Rounding by adding a zero-mean random value (noise) is insecure since the correct 
answer can be deduced by averaging a sufficient number of responses to the 
same query. Rounding by adding a pseudo-random value that depends on the data 
is preferable, because then a given query always returns the same response. 
The method can sometimes be subverted with trackers [SCHL77], by adding dummy 
records to the database [KARP70], or simply by comparing the responses to 
several queries in order to narrow the range of values containing the confi-
dential value [ACHU78, HAQ77]. 
A method of indirect rounding is called error inoculation; this control 
aims to prevent inference by perturbing or replacing the values stored in 
records [BECK79, B0RU71, CAMP77j. Like direct rounding, this control attempts 
to trade accuracy in the statistics for security. One approach is to modify the 
data when the record is created (losing the original data); the problem with 
this approach is that correctness of the raw data may be essential for other 
uses of the data -- e.g., storage and retrieval of patients' medical records. 
A better approach stores a permanent "perturbation factor" in the record along 
with the original data, and applies this factor when the data is used in a query 
[BECK79]. 
A variation of error inocolution which may not disturb the accuracy of the 
statistics is multidimensional transformation or data swapping,; the values of 
fields of records are exchanged so that the record for any particular individual 
is likely to be incorrect, but so that all i-order statistics are preserved 
for i = 0,...,m and some m (an i-order statistic is one derived from a charac-
teristic formula over the values of i attributes); higher order statistics 
are not necessarily correct [DALF.78, SCHL79bj. Data swapping reduces the risk 
of compromise since there is no way of knowing with which individual a disclosed 
value is actually associated. The problem with the approach is that no efficient 
method for finding groups of records whose values can be swapped or of determining 
whether a valid swap even exists is known. 
3.4 Random Samples 
All the controls listed above are subverted by a single 1 die principle 
of compromise: because the questioner can control the composition of each 
query set, he can isolate a single record or value by intersecting query sets. 
Rounding and error inoculation perturb the responses, but the "noise" can 
often be removed by averaging responses for carefully selected query sets. 
The U . S . Census Bureau has for >
t
a r s used the principle of random 
sampling to prevent inference. The questioner may apply responses to a set 
of records no longer selected by him. This prevents inference by depriving 
him of the ability to Isolate a known record. The i960 U . S . Census, for 
example, was distributed on tape as a random sample of one record in 1000 
[HANS7l]. The best snooper would have at best a 1/1000 chance of associating 
a given sample record with the right individual. 
Commercial data management systems now permit the construction of small 
to medium scale dynamic databases. A small fixed sub-sample would not be 
statistically significant and would not represent the current status of the 
data. For this reason, random sampling has been Ignored as a possible 
inference control in modern statistical database systems. 
The remainder of this paper shows that random sampling using large samples 
may effectively reduce risk but maintain high accuracy. 
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4. RAKDOM SAMPLE QUERIES 
Our proposal for random sampling differs in two important ways from 
the traditional statistical sampling methods used by the Census Bureau: 
1. To insure accurate statistics, each sampln contains a large pro-
portion of the records in the query set. To assure timely statistics, 
the sample is formed at the time a query is made. 
2. Rather than applying a query to a sample of the entire database, a 
5ample is formed from each query set. This enables implementation 
of the control at a very low cost. 
The Random Sample Queries (RSQ) control is defined as follows: 
As the query system locates records satisfying a given characteristic 
formula C , it applies a selection function f(C,i) to each record i satis-
fying C; f determines whether i is kept for the sample. This produces a 
sampled query set = | i C X
c
 | f(C,i) = 1 j . The statistic returned to 
it 
the user is calculated from X^,. A parameter p specifies the sampling 
probability that a record is selected. 
The uncertainty introduced by this control is the same as the uncertainty in 
sampling the entire database, with a probability p of selecting a particular 
record for the sample. The expected size of a random sample over the entire 
database of size N is pN. 
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5. IMPLEMENTATION 
A simple case results when p = 1 - 1/2 for some k > 0 . Let r(i) be a 
function which maps the record into a random sequence of m bits. Let g(C) 
be a function which maps formula C into a random sequence of length m over the 
alphabet jo, 1, ; this string Includes exactly k bits and m-k asterisks 
(asterisks denote "don't care"). The i
t h
 record is excluded from the sampled 
query set whenever r(i) matches g(C) ( a "match" exists whenever each non-
asterisk character of g(C) is the same as the corresponding symbol of r(i)). 
The selection function f(C,i) Is thus given by; 
[ 1 if r(i) does not matth g(C) 
f(C, i) = < 
( o if r(i) matches g(C). 
The above method applies for p > 1/2 (e.g., p = .5, .75, .875, and .9375). 
For p <" 1/2, use p = 1/2^; the i
t h
 record Is included In the sample if and 
only if r(i) matches g(C). 
Example. Suppose that p = 7/8, that m = 8,. and that g(C) = »*10*1***". 
If r(i) = "11011000" for some i, that record would match g(c) and be 
excluded from X_. If r generates unique random bit sequences, then the 
Li 
* 
expected size of X^ is 7/8 that of X
c
. 
Strong encryption algorithms are excellent candidates for the functions 
r and g. If the database is encrypted for other security reasons, the function 
r could simply select m bits from some invariant part of the record (e.g., the 
identifier field); this would avoid the computation of r(i) during query 
formation. With strong encryption, two formulae C and D having almost identical 
query sets will map to quite different g(C) and g(D), thereby ensuring that 
* * 




Under RSQs, it is more natural to return frequencies and averages directly, 
as defined by eq. (1), since the statistics are not based on. the entire database, 
and the users may net know what percentage of the records are included in 




c * i * 
FREQ (C) - — , where n^ = l
X
c l
 i s s a m
P ^
e <
^ query set size, 
AVG (C,j> = — v • 
"c
 i 6 x
c 
* 
Note that the expected value of n^ is pn^,; therefore, the expected value of 
the sampled frequency is n /N, the true frequency. Although the use of frequenci 
and averages in place of counts and sums is not required for security, security 
is enhanced due to the rounding errors introduced by division (provided not 
too many significant digits are provided). However, a user who knows p and N 
can compute approximations for both the sampled and unsampled counts and sums: 
COUNT*(C) = FREQ*(C)-pN 
SUW*(C,j) = AVG*(C,j)-COUNT*(C) 
COUNT(C) ~ FREQ*(C)"N 
SUM(C,J) ~ AVG*(C, j)-C0l!NT(C). 
Indeed, it may be necessary for the database to provide the values for p and 
N so that users can judge the significance of the estimates returned. 
A minimum query set size restriction may be necessary with RSQs if the 
sampling probability p is large. Otherwise, all the records of a small query 
set are included in sample with high probability and compromise is possible 
(see Section 7). One alternative to this restriction is a variable p that 
decreases in proportion to the query set size- This could be implemented in 
one of three ways. The first method makes two passes over the data records: 
1) to determine the query set size and select p , and 2) to calculate the response 
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The second method calculates statistics for more than one value of p simul-
taneously, and selects one for the response after the query set size is known. 
The third method "guesses" an appropriate value for p by selecting p proportional 
to the reciproca1 of the number of records scanned unti1 the first record in 
the query set Is found. 
Ideally, the function g should use a normal form for formulae C , so that 
g(C) = g(D) whenever formulae C and D are reducible to eachother. This would 
prevent a questioner from determining the true answer to a query by repeatedly 
asking the same query, though expressed in different forms, and averaging the 
responses. Unfortunately, the problem of reducing a formula to a normal form 
is intractable; even if an efficient algorithm could be found, there are other 
methods for removing the sampling errors (see Section 7.3). 
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6. ANALYSIS OF ERRORS 
RSQs control compromise by introducing small sampling errors into the 
statistics. The relative errors in frequencies are a function of the proba-
bility p of including a record in a sample and of the query set size. The 
relative errors in averages are a function of p , the query set size, and the 
distribution of values in the selected category field. Experimental results 
support the analysis. 
6.1 Frequencies 
* 
Let FREQ (C) be the response returned for a query FREQ(C). The relative 
error between the sampled frequency and the true frequency is given by: 
FREQ*(C) - FREQ(C) 
C
 FREQ(C) 
Appendix A shows that the sampled frequency is an unbiased estimator of the 
true frequency; thus the expected relative error is 0 . The expected root mean 
squared relative error is shown to be: 
«
<f
c> - V W
 < 3 ) 
for query set size n^,. Thus, for fixed p , the expected error decreases as the 
square root of the query set size. 
A 
Figure 1 shows a graph of the error R(f ) as a function of n for several 
values of p . For p > .5, n^ > 100 gives less than a 107. error. For p = .9375, 
n
c
 > 667 gives < 1*£ error. Low relative errors are possible with high p even 
though query set sizes are relatively small. 




Let AVC (C,j) be the response returned tor a query AVG(C,j). The rela-
tive error between the sampled average and the actual average is given by; 





Appendix B shows that AVG (C,j) is an unbiased estimator of AVG(C,j), that 
the expected relative error is 0, and that the expected root mean square 
relative error can be approximated by: 




> ~ - j - * - ~ H ( f
c
) 
x Tl pin - 1) x 
for. query set size n , where x and 0* are the mean and standard deviation of 
i» x 
the data values in category J taken over the query set X . 
U 
As an example, suppose the data values for a category are uniformly 




 s + 1 







 s - 1 
< r
x
= 7 - *> = — 1 2 -
1 = 1 
R(a„ .) ~ D(s) R ( f
r
) (4) 
L . , J — L. 
°<E) - 4? 1 s+1 V 12 
is the coefficient of variation for the distribution of data values. 
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A 
The results discussed in the next section show that R(a ) closely approxi-
^»J 
mates the actual errors observed in our experiments. 
Figure 2 shows the function D(s) rises rapidly and quickly approaches the 
limit: 
When the data in a given category are uniformly distributed, th. relative 
errors in averages behave the same as in frequencies but are 40% smaller. 
6»3 Experimental Results 
Random Sample Queries were tested OP databases of size N = 100, N = 500, 
and N = 1000. The objective of the experiments was to measure the tradeoff 
between the error in the statistics and the threat of compromise. Four values 
of p were used -- .5, .75, .875, .9375, corresponding to specifications of 
between 1 and 4 bits respectively in the function g(C). A pseudo-random 
number generator was used to create records for the database and to specify 
the functions r and g . Each record i had an 18-bit randomly generated ID 
field and several data fields; the ID field was used as the value of r(l). 
The data fields were generated randomly over a uniform distribution. 
Three hundred random characteristic formulae were used to measure the 
error in the statistics. For each formula C , the relative errors in FREQ (G) 
* 
and AVG (C,j) (for all data fields j) were calculated. Errors were classified 
according to 10 equal intervals of [0, N ] . For each interval, the mean 
absolute relative errors and the root mean squared relative errors were cal-
culated for frequencies and averages. For comparison, the expected root 
lim D(s) 




Figure 2. Coefficient of variation D(s) 
squared relative error in the 
over the interval [ 1,s]. 
in computation of the root mean 
averages for uniform distributions 
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mean squared errors were also computed for an interval of the form 
[k -jjj , (k + 1) -j^ ] using n
c
 at the midpoint (k + y ) for formulae (3) 
and (4). 
The results are shown in Table I (a)-(d) for N = 100 and N = 1000, and 
for p = .5 and p = .9375. Each table gives the mean absolute relative error, 
the root mean squared relative error, and the expected root mean squared 
relative error for frequencies and averages. Averages are shown for a variable 
uniformly distributed in the range 64]. The estimated root mean squared 
relative errors closely approximate the actual root mean squared errors. The 
approximation is not as close in the first interval since most of the actual 
query sets were much smaller than the midpoint of the interval. The mean 
absolute relative errors are about 207
o

















. • I 
1- 10 50 0.518 0.646 0.447 0.3S5 0.534 0.284 
10- 20 21 0.115 0.150 0.258 0.104 0.132 0.152 
' 20- 30 31 0.127 0.156 0.200 0.102 0.127 0.116 
20- 10 15 0.160 0.201 0.169 0.059 0.077 0.097 
.40- 50 27 0.106 0.131 0.14 9 0.066 0.077 0.086 
50- 60 71 0.090 0.107 0.135 0.063 0.076 0.077 
60- 70 27 0.094 0.109 0.124 0.040 0.052 0.071 
70- 80 28 0.079 0.111 0.115 0.053 0.065 0.066 
80- 90 20 0.094 0.106 0.108 0.047 0.056 0.062 
90-100 6 0.104 0.112 0.103 0.045 0,052 0.059 
Table I (a). Mean absolute relative error, rpot mean squared relative error, and 
the expected root mean squared relative error for frequencies and 
averages for N = 100 and p = .5. 













1- 100 40 0.232 0.348 0.141 0.082 0.117 0.081 
100- 200 24 0.060 0.073 0.082 0.037 0.048 0.047 
200- 300 25 0.047 0.058 0.063 0.021 0.027 0.036 
300- 400 11 0.031 0.037 0.053 0.030 0.034 0.030 
400- 500 32 0.039 0.047 0.047 0.025 0.029 0.027 ' 
500- 600 65 0.034 0.044 0.043 0.021 0.026 0.024 
600- 700 33 0.034 0.043 0.039 0.019 0.023 0.022 
700- 800 43 0.032 0.037 0.037 0.015 0.019 0.021 
800- 900 26 0.024 0.029 0.034 0.016 0.018 0.020 
900-1000 1 0.029 0 0.032 0.000 0 0.018 
Table I (b). Mean absolute relative error, root mean squared relative error, and 
the expected root mean squared relative error for frequencies and 
















c . i > 
1- 10 39 0.079 0.102 0.115 0.019 0.081 0.073 
10- 20 27 0.053 0.065 0.067 0.029 0.045 0.039 
20- 30 25 0.041 0,049 0.052 0.018 0.025 0.030 
30- 40 9 0.025 0.037 0.044 0.017 0.024 0.025 
40- 50 35 0.030 0.035 0.038 0.017 0.023 0.022 
50- 60 56 0.029 0.035 0.035 0.012 0.016 0.020 
60- 70 34 0.030 0.036 0.032 0.015 0.019 0.018 
70- 80 32 0.020 0.024 0.030 0.012 0.016 0.017 
80- 90 27 0.021 0.025 0.028 0.013 0.018 0.016 
90-100 12 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.011 0.015 0.015 
Table I (c) • Mean absolute relative error, root mean squared relative error, and 
the expected root mean squared relative error for frequencies and 
averages for N = 100 and p = .9375. 
FREQ*(C) AVG*(C,j) 










Site Range Queries Rel.Err Rel.Err Rel.Err Rel.Err 
1- 100 48 0.042 0.059 0.037 0.013 0.021 0.021 
100- 200 18 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.010 0.013 0.012 
200- 300 30 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.009 • 
300- 400 11 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.006 0.008 0.008 
400- 500 30 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.007 
500- 600 75 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.006 
600- 700 28 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.006 
700- 800 37 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.004 " 0.005 0.005 
800- 900 . 18 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.005 
900-1000 5 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Table I (d). Mean absolute relative error, root mean 
the expected root mean squared relative 
averages for N = 1000 and p = .9375. 
squared relative erroT, and 
error for frequencies and-
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7. COMPROMISE 
RSQs control comporraise by reducing a questioner's ability to interrogate 
the desired query sets precisely. We have studied the extent to which the 
control may be circumvented by three different methods of attack: small query 
sets (of size 0 or 1), general trackers, and error romoval by averaging. 
Compromise may be possible with small query sets unless p is small or a 
minimum query set size restriction is imposed. Trackers, on the other hand, 
are no longer a useful tool for compromise. Attacks based on removing the 
sampling errors by averaging responses require a Large number of "equivalent" 
queries. 
7.1 Small Query Sets (of Size 0 or 1) 
Suppose that a questioner knows an individual satisfying formula C . If 
FREQ(C) = 1/N, then the questioner can deduce whether or not that individual 
also has an additional property "a" by posing the query FREQ(C'a) [HOFF70], since 
f 1/N = > the individual has property a 
FREQ(C-a) \ 
£ 0 = > the individual does not have property a 
This technique can be used to compromise under RSQs only if the questioner 
ft 
can infer with high probability that a response FREQ (C) = 1/N (or 0) implies 
FREQ(C) = 1/N (or 0). In appendix C , we show that 
El = Pr[FREQ(C) = 1/N I FREQ*(C) = 1/N] 










 kJ the probability of asking a query 
with query set size k,and 
N
 k 
M z ) = z 
k=0 
is the generating function for the distribution of a^ a^,. 
As an example, suppose that the a^ are geometrically distributed with 
parameter X, for 0 < A < 1« For large N , A O ~ A ) (see Appendix C), and 
EI = [ I - A d - p ) ]
2 
EO = 1 - M l - p ) , 
Figure 3 shows a graph of the cumulative distribution function A ^ = 
Pr[n
c
 > k] - a^ + ... + a^ for A = .5 (corresponding to mean query set size of 
A/( !-X)= 1). Figure 4 displays El and E^ for A = .5 as a function of p. The 
odds are 50% that a response of 0 is correct for all p and that a response of 
1/N is correct for p > .41. For p > .9, the odds are 907. that a response of 
1/N is correct and 95% that a response of 0 is correct. 
The conclusion is that inference of the true value of FREQ(C) is straight-
forward for large p; either a minimum query set size restriction, or a p that 
diminishes with n^, must be used to prevent this. 
7.2 Trackers 
Several random tracker compromises were attempted in the experimental 
databases of size N = 100, N = 500, and N = 1000. The target was a random 
individual uniquely identified by some formula C . A random tracker character-




Figure 3. Cumulative distribution A
k
 of query set size' for a geometric 
distribution with parameter X ~ -5-
Figu re 4 . Probabilities EQ and E^ that the sampling frequency is the true 
frequency as a function of p. 
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using eq. (2). Table XI gives the mean absolute relative error In the estimates 
for 50 random attacks using p = .9375 and the three values of N . The averages 
are given for a variable uniformly di stributed over the range For 
frequencies, the mean absolute relative error in the estimates was over 200'/. 
for N =• 100 and over 7007. for N = 1000. Although the query errors decrease 
in N , the tracker errors actually increase in N since the absolute error 
using eq. (2) is magnified for larger N . The mean absolute relative errors 
in averages were nearly 500% and seemed to be independent of N . 
For comparison, the same tracker attacks were also studied under a simple 
rounding control (rather than RSQs). When rounding errors were comparable to 
the RSQ errors, the tracker attacks were more likely to subvert the rounding 
control than the random sample control. In many cases, the tracker revealed 
the exact value despite the rounding con:.. , 
Mean Rel. Err. Mean Rel. Err. 
N for FREQ(C) for AVG(C.j) 
100 2.22 4.42 
500 4.48 5.89 
1000 7.59 5.69 
Table II. Mean absolute relative error in the estimates for 50 random tracker 
attacks using p = .9375. 
2U 
7.3 Error Removal 
Since the sane query always returns the same response, it is necessary 
to pose different, but "equivalent" queries to remove the sampling errors. 
There are two methods for removing the error in the response to a queryz 
1) averaging the responses of several queries which specify the same query set, 
and 2) averaging estimates obtained from queries about disjoint subsets of a 
query set. 
The first method averages the responses of m queries which specify the 
same query set but employ different random samples. Let q(C) be a query for 
a frequency or average with response q (C). The questioner poses queries of 
* * 
the form q(C.) ( i = 1,..., m ) , where X„ = X but X # X„. An estimate 
1 L , u L , L 
i I 
q(C> for q(C) is computed from 
q(C) = ± j k q*(C ) . 
i=l 
Each query q(C^) could use a formula C^ which, though theoretically possible to 
reduce to C , is not reduced to C so that g(C) # g(C^). For example, if 
C = "MALE-(AGE > 50yrs)", might be "FEMALE*(AGE < 50yrs)'\ Alternatively, 
C^ could be obtained by "OR-ing*
1
 into C terms which are known to specify empty 
query sets; that is, C^ = C + D , where IX^I = 0. For example, if G is as 
before, C
2
 might be "MALE.(ACE > 50yrs) + MALE•PREGNANT". 
The second method averages m estimates for a query q(C) using disjoint 
subsets of the query set X . The i ^ estimate, denoted q.(C), is computed 
from the responses to queries using formulae C ^ , . . . , C ^ , where 
z. 
l 








The estimate q(C) for q(C) is then obtained from the average: 
$<c> = ± i ^ < c ) . 
1=1 




FREQ. (C) = FREQ (C,, ) -
1
 k=l
 l k 
For example, if C = "FFMALE", FREQ(C) could be estimated from: 
FREQj(C) = FREQ*(FEMALE•PREGNANT) + FREQ*(FEMALE•PREGNANT) 
FkEQ
2
(C) = FREQ*(FEMALE-(AGE < 20yrs)) + FREQ*(FEMALE•(AGE > 20yrs)) 
etc. 
Estimates for averages are similarly obtained by summing the products of 
responses for averages and frequencies. 
* 
Since the sampled query sets X_ u-jcu to obtain an estimate an estimate 
C
i k 
are independently selected from the disjoint query sets X- , and since the 
* /s 
union of the X is a sample of X , the expected error in the estimate q.(C) 
ik . + 
is the same as in a single response q (C ), where X^, = X^,. Therefore, the 
A
 j 
expected error in each estimate q^(C) under the second method is the same as 
* 
a single response q (Cj) under the first method, and the same number of estimates 
m , must be averaged under the second method as responses under the first method 
to obtain the same level of confidence in the estimate c^(C). However, the 
second method requires more queries since several queries are required to compute 
each estimate q^(C). Therefore, we shall analyze the number of queries required 
to compromise under the first method, as it provides a lower bound on m . 
* * 
Let F^, ..., F
m
 be the responses for m independent queries which estimate 
FREQ(C) for some C . Let n = JX I, and let 
26 
be an approximation to the true value F = FFFQ(C). From Appendix A , the 




i " ra T T l ~ ~ 
i=l 














 ^ V a r ( F
1
) = - j m ^ = 
F m i=l m N p m N p 
For large m (m > 30 should be sufficient when the distribution of possible 
* A 
responses for each is symmetric), the distribution of F is approximately normal 
[FEIL50]; therefore, the confidence intervals for the true frequency F given the A 
estimate F are: 
A 
Pr[F £ [F + 1 . 6 4 5 ^ ] ] ~ .90 
Pr[F 6 [F + 1.960ffp]] ~ -
9 5 
Pr[F £ [F + 2 . 5 7 5 ^ ] ] ~ .99 
If we assume that an intruder requires a 957. confidence interval, the length 
of this interval Is given by 





F N i p m 
Now, I < 1/N is required to estimate F to within one record (such accuracy is 
required, for example, to estimate frequencies for small query sets using 
trackers). The number of queries required to achieve this accuracy is: 
» > P . 9 2 )
2








) "c • 
For fixed p , the function grows linearly in the query set size n . For p = .5, 
c 
over 450 queries are required to estimate frequencies for query sets of size 30; 
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over 1500 queries are required to estimate frequencies for query sets of 
size 100. For p = .9375, 100 queries are required to estimate frequencies 
for query sets of size 100. 
* * 
Next, let Aj A^ be the responses for m independent queries which 
— 2 
estimate AVG(C, j). Let A = AVG(C, j), and let x and ff" denote the mean and 
variance of the data values in category j for the records in the query set X 
(i.e., x = A). Let 
JL , m A
 1 * 





be an estimate of the true average A . From Appendix B , the mean of A is 
7 i ® 
A = — > A 
m ^ L m 
* 1/ - I 
= - | m xl = 
1 m \ / 
A 
and the variance of A can be approximated with: 














For large m and n„, the distribution of A is approximately normal, whereupon 
(j 
the 95% confidence interval is defined by: 
Tr[A G [A + 1.960 0 ^ ] ] ~ .95 
"" A " 
The length of this interval is given by 
{ E i 
I mp n 
- P 
I = 3.92(T /v 3.92 <T 
£ " x ,
 m p 
Now, I < 2Hx is sufficient to estimate A with a relative error of at most H , 
for 0 < H < 1. Solving the above equation for m , 
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2 
? (TV 1 - P 
m > ( 1.96) — ~ -= (5) 
x
 H
 P "C 
queries must be made to obtain an estimate with relative error at most H. 
To determine a bound on the relative error H that can be tolerated to 
achieve compromise, suppose that estimates for averages are used in the simples 
form of attack: the tracker. Let D be a characteristic uniquely identifying 
an individual, and consider an estimate for AVG(D, j) for some category j 
using eq.(2) (we assume that a minimum query set size restriction is in effect 
so that the query AVG(D,j) is not directly answerable). Rewriting eq.(2), 
we have: 
AVG (D, j ) = AVG(EH-T, j + AVG(EH-T, j ) " ^ - AVC(T,j)n
T
 - AVC(T,j)n- . 
Since we are interested in determining the number of estimates required for 
a single AVC query, suppose that all of the terms on the right-hand side of 
the above equation are known exactly except for one AVG (this will also give 
a worst-case analysis of the threat). Let A^ = AVG(C.j) represent the unknown 
A 
AVG and let Ap = AVG(D,j). The relative error in the estimate A
Q
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Therefore, a relative error of at most 
in the estimate A^ is necessary to obtain an estimate A ^ with relative error 
at most h . Substituting for H in (5) gives: 
m > (1.96)' § ' 1 ( 3 ( 3 
As an example, consider the special case where the data values are uniformly 
distributed over an interval [lis]. The coefficient of variation squared is 
(see Section 6.2): 
<T> X - -
2 — ( — y 
12 
= D (s) 
In Section 6.2, we showed that D (s) is approximately 1/3 for moderately large 
s (e.g., s > 10); thus 
m > 1 
estimates are needed. For h = .1 and A^ near the average, this is 
> 128 
For n =• 100, over 853 estimates are required for p = .9375 and over 12,800 (J 
for p = .5. In a database of size 20,000 if a tracker is used which charac-
terizes roughly half of the population, over 85,300 estimates of the averages 
are required for p = .9375 and over 1,280,000 for p = .5. For h - .01, 
the number of estimates needed is increased by a factor of 100. IE A^ is 
much smaller than the average A
c >
 even more queries are required to obtain 
a good estimate; however, if A ^ is larger than A ^ , fewer queries are required. 
Whereas the relative errors in averages (for uniform distributions) are' lower 
than in frequencies, more queries are required to obtain estimates accurate 
enough to compromise with averages than with frequencies. 
For large query sets, the number of queries required to obtain reliable 
estimates of confidential data under RSQs is sufficiently large to protect 
against manual attack using trackers. A computer might be able to subvert 
the control by systematically generating the necessary queries. To prevent 
computer aided attacks, the system should recognize queries which specify 
identical query sets. To the extent that characteristic formulae are reduced 
to normal form before processing, the threat is reduced since the same random 
sample will be selected and, therefore, the same response returned. Although 
it is more difficult to recognize queries about disjoint subsets of a query 
set, a larger number of queries are needed to obtain reliable estimates. 
Furthermore, it should not be difficult t o d e t e c t this type of systematic 
attack with "threat-monitoring" [H0FF70]. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The Random Sample Queries control proposed here deals directly with the 
basic principle of compromise by making it impossible for a questioner to 
control precisely the composition of query sets. Queries for frequencies 
and averages are computed using random samples drawn from the query sets. To 
insure accurate and timely statistics, each sample contains a large proportion 
of the records in the query set and is formed at the time a query is m a d e . 
As the query system locates records satisfying a characteristic formula C , 
a selection function which is dependent on C determines whether or not each 
record is kept for the sample. A parameter p specifies the sampling probability 
that a record is selected. The cost of implementing the control is extremely low. 
For both frequencies and averages, the relative error in the statistics 
decreases as the square root of the over" set size. In contrast, the effort 
required to compromise by removing the sampling errors increases linearly in 
the query set size due to larger absolute errors. Therefore, statistics based 
on large groups are both more accurate and less susceptable to compromise than 
statistics based on small groups. A minimum query set size restriction can 
control compromise with small query sets. For frequencies and averages taken 
over uniform distributions, relative errors between 17. and 10% can be obtained 
for allowable queries, while an enormous number of "equivalent" queries must 
be posed in order to compromise by removing the sampling errors. 
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APPENDIX A . ERRORS IN ESTIMATING FREQUENCIES 
•jc 
Let FREQ(C) be a query for a frequency, and let FREQ (C) be the sampled 
frequency. Let n denote the size of the query set and let n* denote the 
U U C 
* * 




 is binomially distributed with parameter p: 
- = Pk u.P>Vk 









p ( l - p ) 
* * 
Letting denote the response FREQ (C) = n„/pN, the mean and variance of F„ are 
u O C 
—
 n
c ~ J i 
F
C = N 
* n (1-p) 
V a r ( F
c





 = FREQ(C), the sampled frequency is an unbiased estimator of the true 
frequency. 
Let * 
n n \ 2 
* . 2 I — " — 







be the squared relative error in FREQ (C). The mean squared relative error 
(over all choices of the sample) is: 
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4 P J 2 ( V « ( F C ) ) = ^ 




Thus, the root mean squared relative error 
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APPENDIX B . ERRORS IN ESTIMATING AVERAGES 
Let AVG(C,j) be a query for the average value in category j, and let 
* 
AVG \C,j) be the sampled average. Let n denote the size of the query set X 
U C 
* * ( i 
n^ the size o£ the sample X and let • ••> x^ j denote the values 
.. ^ 2 ^ 
| i 6 X r. Let x and <r be the mean and variance o f i x , . x i» 
L i j L> •> X ^ 1 
"c 




c 2 j v 2 
<T
X
 = — ^ <x - x ) . x n
C 1=1 
* */ • * 
Let A_ , denote the response AVG (C,j); the expected value of A . is 
A* = ^ A* .(k) Pr[n* = k ] , 
, J
 k=0
 G , J C 
* * 
where A (k) is the expected response when n = k . For k > 0, 
C»j ^ 
,J (J A^xc i C A 
I AI = k 
/ V 1\ / NC\ 
Since each x^^ appears in L
 t l l e
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— — n_x / 1 \ 
C I T (
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This implies the sampled average is an unbiased estimator of the true average. 
* 
T o determine the variance of AVG (c,j), we first evaluate the sum of the squares 
for k > 1: 




A C X * I 6 A ' 
| A | = k 
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: : ) 
The variance in AVG (C,j) is then 
n
G 
Var(A* .) = Var(A* .(k)) Pr[n* = k ] 
k=0
 G , J c 
* * * 
where Var(A_ .(k)) is the variance in AVG (C,j) when n = k . For k > 1, 
> J " 
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For k = 1, 








JAI ~ 1 
i ^ -
2 
which is Che same as would be obtained by substituting k = 1 in eq. (6). 





( 0 > ) =
 * 
Therefore, n^ 
Var(A* ,) = Var(A* .(0)) Pr[n* = 0 ] + Var(A* .(k)) Pr[n**= k ] 
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For large query sets, the distribution of n^, is approximately normal with mean 
~~* * * 
n = n p and variance Var(n ) = p(l-p)n„. The value of Var(A„ .(k)) at k = n_p 
VJ L» Li J ^ 
* V I * 
approximates Var(A .) in the range k = n p + V Var(n„) . Now, 
l j , J — * L. 
Var(A* .) = Var(A* .(k)), 
^ > J t J 
* 
and, since the graph of Var(A .(k)) is concave up, 
J 





 U p 







L e t * * 
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be the squared relative error in AVG (C,j). The mean squared relative error 
(over al choices of the sample) is: 
2
V —
1 ) ( 
Thus, the root mean squared relative error is approximated by: 
2 a
c,j ; - G M - H s t e : 
A tfi -\/ p 
R t
- c . j > - V T - T • x l p(n„- 1) 
C 
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APPENDIX C . COMPROMISE WITH SMALL QUERY SETS 
Let a^ (for k = 0,...,N) be the probability of asking a query with query 
set size k, and let 
* k 





A' (z) = a kz 
k = 0
 k 
be the generating function and its derivative for the distribution of a ^ , . . . ^ . 
•k k if' 
Let F denote FREQ(C) and F denote FREQ (C). If the sampled frequency F is 
1/N, the probability that the true frequency F is also 1/N is given by: 
* 
Tr[F = 1/N | F* = 1/N] = 
Pr[F = 1/N and F = 1/N] 







If the sampled frequency F is 0 , the probability that the true frequency F 
is also 0 is given by: 
* Pr[F - 0 and F* = 0 ] 
Pr[F = 0 I F = 0 ] = -









 A(l-p) ' j 
i 
k=0 ! 
Consider the special case where the a^ are geometrically distributed 
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Similarly, for lar^e N, j 
a
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Therefore, j 
rr[F = 0 | F* = 0] = ~ l - A ( l - p ) . 
A(l-p) 
